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REPLY AND CROSS RESPONDENT BRIEF OF SAMPSON

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondents in their "Statement of the Case" (Respondent's Brief,
pp.

2-6) have improperly asserted material which is not relevant to

this section of the Brief.

For example, the discussion concerning the

Osborn judgment (Respondent's Brief, pp.

2-3) has no relevance to the

procedural context of this case since the Osborn litigation is not now
in issue.

The Osborn judgment procedure, if it has any relevance, goes

to the question of the lower court's finding of improper conduct by
Sampson which is discussed in the Argument sections of both Briefs.
-1-

Aside from this improper inclusion, it should also be noted that
Respondents failed to mention that the Osborn judgment was only
purchased by Sampson in 1981 after all negotiations had failed and
after all attorney-client relationships had ceased.
Respondents1 attack upon the Utah State Bar Committee proceeding
is also inappropriate.

The Utah Supreme Court has approved the

procedure utilized by the Bar Commission in screening complaints
against members.

Respondents had full and ample opportunity to present

witnesses and argue their contentions before the Bar Committee
regarding Sampson's alleged unethical conduct.

The fact that the Bar

Committee failed to find sufficient allegations to go to a full
adversarial proceeding does not eliminate the "probative value" of the
Committee's conclusion that insufficient evidence of serious misconduct
was present justifying such a hearing.

This Committee report is

certainly collateral evidence supporting the lower court's finding that
no punitive damages were justified under the circumstances of this
case.
Finally, the discussion by Respondents concerning the "inadequate
transcript" (Respondents' Brief, pp.

5-6) is discussed in several

other portions of Respondents' Brief and will be addressed in
Appellant's Reply Brief herein.

As to the procedural events concerning

this claim of inadequate transcript, it should be observed that on two
separate occasions September 18, 1987 and January 12, 1988 Respondents
filed with the Utah Supreme Court motions to dismiss the appeal and for
summary affirmance based upon the same contention of an inadequate
transcript.

In all instances the Utah Supreme Court denied

Respondents' motions and subsequently transferred this appeal to this
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Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant Sampson does not contest the facts contained in
Respondents1 "Statement of Facts" (Respondents1 Brief, p.

6-23) since

the actual events which occurred are essentially undisputed.
Appellant, however, does not necessarily agree with the
characterization of these facts by Respondents or with the titles used
by Respondents in their various subdivisions.

Because of the extensive

findings by the lower court it would conceivably be possible to write
several completely different versions of the facts by highlighting
those areas of concern to the writer.

In this appeal, however, the

only facts which are relevant concern those which support the
conclusions and judgment of the lower court and any other facts not
pertaining to this question are extraneous and irrelevant.
Finally, it should be noted that all record references in the
"Statement of Facts" of Respondents relate to the Findings and
Conclusions of the lower court.

Respondents have made no attempt to

cite the underlying transcript upon which the Findings and Conclusions
of the lower court are based.

Thus, Respondents are relying upon the

Findings and Conclusions of the lower court and not upon the testimony
of the witnesses at trial.

This reliance upon the lower court's

findings supports Appellant's position that the actual record in this
case is unnecessary in view of the issues presently raised on appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE FAILURE OF SAMPSON TO INCLUDE THE ENTIRE
TRIAL TESTIMONY DOES NOT MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE
FOR THIS COURT TO MEANINGFULLY REVIEW THE
JUDGMENT.
-3-

Respondents contend, as they did in their various motions before
the Utah Supreme Court, that the failure of Sampson to designate the
entire trial testimony eliminates the ability of Sampson to now appeal
the judgment entered against him.

(Respondents1 Brief, pp.

26-33).

Respondents also contend that under the standards of review applicable
to this appeal the judgment cannot be reversed.
pp.

33-35).

(Respondents' Brief,

Both of these arguments are without merit.

Sampson readily agrees that the arguments now advanced by
Respondents would be correct if the context of this appeal were
different.

If, for example, Sampson was contesting the factual

findings of the lower court on the basis that insufficient evidence
existed to justify such finding Respondents' argument would be germane.
In the Smith v. Vuicich case cited by Respondents (Respondents' Brief,
p.

27) the appellant was arguing that the jury verdict was based upon

insufficient evidence.

Obviously, without a full and complete record

the sufficiency of the evidence cannot be addressed by either the
complaining party or an appellate court.
The other decisions cited by Respondents (Respondents' Brief, pp.
27-29) all deal with an attack upon the sufficiency of evidence in one
form or another.

In all of these cases it is incumbent upon an

appellant to include the entire record for review since to selectively
exclude portions of the record eliminates any argument the appellant
can make that there is no evidence to support the lower court's
decision.
Respondents seemingly do not understand the difference between an
attack upon a finding of fact based upon sufficiency of evidence as
opposed to a conclusion of law based upon an inadequate factual basis.
-4-

In this appeal, Appellant Sampson is not attacking the accuracy of the
lower court's Findings of Fact as to the events and transactions which
occurred in this litigation.

Rather, Sampson is attacking the

conclusions drawn by the lower court based upon those facts.
To illustrate this distinction the following example is offered.
Assume that a traffic accident has occurred and that a trial is held in
the lower court.

During the court proceeding five witnesses testify

that driver "X" ran a red light whereas one witness testifies that
driver "Y" ran the red light.

The court enters a specific finding that

Driver M Y" ran the red light and that driver "X" did not run the red
light.

On appeal, driver "Y" would contend that the factual finding of

the lower court was not supported by substantial evidence in that five
of the witnesses were completely to the contrary.

He would have to

contend that the only witness in support of driver "X" was not capable
of belief and should have been ignored by the lower court.

In a case

such as this it would be essential to have all the testimony relating
to all the witnesses and their observations of the light.

The holdings

of the various decisions cited by Respondent are applicable to this
type of situation.
As to the instant case, however, a different situation occurs.
Assume in the previous example that all of the witnesses agree that
driver "X" ran the red light and that driver "Y" did not run the red
light.

The court enters a specific factual finding to this effect.

The court then concludes, however, that driver "Y" is negligent and
that driver "X" is not negligent.

On appeal, driver "Y" is merely

claiming that even though the facts are not disputed and that the lower
court has correctly interpreted the facts based upon the evidence, the
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legal conclusion reached from those facts is erroneous.

It is not

necessary to cite the testimony of the various witnesses since there is
no disagreement as to what factually occurred.

The only question on

appeal is what the court concluded based upon the undisputed facts.
This last example is applicable to the instant case.

After

reviewing the transcript and the numerous documents in this file
Appellantfs counsel has concluded that the lower court properly found
the sequential facts which occurred in this case but incorrectly made
legal conclusions based upon those facts.

It is therefore unnecessary

to have the supporting record in this case.

In other instances, the

court made its legal conclusions without sufficient findings to support
them.

The failure to have sufficient findings negates the validity of

the legal conclusions and again the record is not required.
Several cases from Utah and other jurisdictions are helpful in
understanding these distinctions.
698 P.2d 504 (Or.

App.

In Ierulli v. Lutz Development Co.,

1985) a case was appealed concerning the

validity of the findings and conclusions of the lower court even though
no record at all was filed with the Court of Appeals.

The court there

noted that findings of fact can be inadquate in three situations.
First, when they are not supported by any competent, substantial
evidence; second, when they are unresponsive to or outside the issues
framed by the pleadings; and third, when they do not support the
conclusions of law on which judgment is based.

The court noted that in

the first two instances it was unable to review any contentions without
a record but as to the third type of instance, such review was possible
since the record was not required.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals also succinctly stated the

-6-

principles regarding conclusions of law and factual findings when it
said:
A "conclusion of law" is a decision of the court
stemming from the ultimate factual issues which
determine the result of the dispute in a non-jury
trial. A conclusion of law must find support in the
findings of fact. Ultimate facts are the facts which
are necessary to determine the issues in the case, as
distinguished from the evidentiary facts supporting
them. The lower court's conclusions of law must find
support in the court's findings in order to be
sustained on appeal. Romero v. J.W. Jones
Construction Co., 651 P.2d 1302 (N.M. App. 1982).
(Emphasis added).
As Respondents note in their Brief (Respondents' Brief, p.

33)

when attacking the sufficiency of the evidence it is necessary to
marshall all of the evidence in support of the trial court's finding
and then demonstrate that even reviewing that evidence in a light most
favorable to the court the evidence is insufficient to support the
finding.

Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985); Hansen v.

Stewart, 87 Utah Adv.

Rpt.

46 (July 28, 1988).

In the Scharf decision the court noted the distinction between
marshalling of facts when the sufficiency of evidence is being
questioned as opposed to attacking a conclusion of law.

The court

stated:
We next consider Erickson's claim that the trial
court erred in its conclusions of law. The standard of
review differs from that applicable to factual
findings; we accord conclusions of law no particular
deference, but review them for correctness. 700 P.2d
at 1070.
In that decision one of the questions of law was whether a
.particular sale was commercially reasonable.

In affirming the lower

court's decision the Supreme Court stated, "The facts found by the
trial court provide ample support for the legal conclusion that the
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sale was commercially reasonable." Id. at 10.71.
In the instant case the same type of question exists; namely,
whether the actions of Sampson constituted an improper means or was for
an improper purpose and that such actions or purpose was the proximate
cause of any damages suffered by Respondents.

The conclusions of the

lower court in finding damages against Sampson for tortiously
interferring with contract can only be sustained if the legal
conclusions upon which such judgment is based are also supported by the
factual findings of the lower court.

With this issue in focus it is

not required that the entire record be presented to this Court for
review since Appellant accepts for the purposes of this appeal all of
the underlying factual findings by the lower court as true but
disagrees with the conclusions and characterizations given to these
findings by the lower court.
Sampson takes exception, therefore, to the statement by the
respondents that Sampson is attempting to "sanitize" the evidence by
only selecting that favorable to Sampson's position.
Brief, pp.

30-31).

(Respondents'

Since the lower court in rendering its extensive

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law based such Findings and
Conclusions upon the entire record no such sanitizing has occurred.
The lower court effectively took into account all of the testimony
introduced by Respondents when the court rendered its opinion.
Next, the Respondents heavily rely upon the statement made by
Sampson's counsel before a Utah Supreme Court hearing that the record
*as totally inadequate to challenge a judgment at the time a request to
supplement the record was being made.
30-31).

(Respondents' Brief, pp.

The reliance upon this statement, however, is greatly

-8-

6,

misplaced.

At the time the motions occurred before the Utah Supeme

Court Appellant's counsel had not had the opportunity to review either
the exhibits or the transcripts of the case.

He assumed that all

avenues of appeal should be left open including a claim of sufficiency
of evidence.

Naturally, under that situation Appellant attempted to

supplement the designation of record since it had been prepared by the
court reporter and had already been filed with the Clerk of the Sureme
Court.
After the motion was denied Appellant's counsel then reviewed the
record and exhibits.

After such review it was decided that even had

the entire record been preserved for review that a sufficiency of
evidence claim would not have been made since the factual Findings of
operative facts made by the lower court were essentially all correct
and that because of the high standard of review in sufficiency of
evidence cases such an effort would have been fruitless.

Thus, the

fact that the present record is totally inadequate to challenge the
judgment on the sufficiency of evidence grounds is not of any
consequence to the issues now being raised in this appeal relating to
Conclusions of Law and characterizations of facts made by the lower
court.
The filing of the cross appeal by Respondents has also complicated
the arguments now being advanced by them.

While Respondents are

adamant that the failure to have a complete record eliminates the
possibility of review as to Sampson's claim (Respondents' Brief, pp.
26-35), they make no attempt to justify the ability of this Court to
review the cross appeal in which, under the theory advanced by
Respondents, a full record is also required.
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(Respondents' Brief, pp.

57-71).
Several events which occurred during the proceedings of this case
can also be cited against the respondents.

On November 28, 1986

Respondents filed the following Certificate regarding the record.

They

stated:
Appellants [Respondents under the present case]
above-named, through their counsel, hereby certify
pursuant to Rule 11(b)(1), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, that they do not intend to rely on any
transcript of the proceedings other than those, if any,
requested by Respondent [Sampson] in this case or by
Appellants [Sampson] in related appeal No. 86-0565.
Respondents, therefore, made no effort to supplement the designation of
record made by Sampson and are therefore essentially stuck with the
designation, whether it be good or bad, as it now stands.
On October 5, 1987 a hearing was held before the Utah Supreme
Court on Sampson's motion to supplement the record.

At that time

Justice Stewart specifically asked Respondents1 counsel whether the
additional record would be necessary for Respondents to properly
present their cross appeal.

Respondents1 counsel stated that it would

not be required since Respondents were relying entirely upon the
findings of the lower court and not upon the record.
The present cross appeal is arguing that the lower court failed to
award damages to the respondents based upon the evidence adduced at
trial.

If, as Respondents argue in the first portion of their brief, a

party is precluded from relying upon the findings of the lower court
without having the entire record available then none of the arguments
advanced by the respondents on their cross appeal can be presented to
this Court.
Thus, Respondents are in the horns of a dilemma.

-10-

Either the

record is insufficient for both the appellant and the respondents to
argue any of the issues now before this Court or, in the alternative,
the record is sufficient and both sides are entitled to argue upon the
designated record and upon the Findings and Conclusions entered by the
lower court.

Respondents cannot seek to eliminate the appeal of

Sampson while at the same time pursuing their own appeal when both
appeals are based upon the same premises.
With this explanation of the procedural context of this appeal it
now remains to examine the merits of the substantive arguments advanced
by Sampson.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING SAMPSON HAD
INTENTIONALLY INTERFERRED WITH THE BUSINESS
RELATIONSHIPS OF DEFENDANTS.
A.

There Was No Factual Finding Sufficient
to Justify the Conclusion that Sampson Had
An Improper Purpose in His Dealings With
The Limited Partnerships.

Appellant in his opening brief discussed the standard to be
applied in determining an "improper purpose" under the Supreme Court's
decision of Leigh Furniture and Carpet.
pp.

30-34).

(Appellant's Opening Brief,

Sampson contended that the legal conclusion of improper

motive reached by the lower court was not supported by the actual
factual findings of the transaction.
Respondents counter by arguing that the incomplete record in the
appeal precludes Sampson from demonstrating that the factual findings
were erroneous and that the existing record supports the conclusion.
(Respondents' Brief, pp.

42-43).

The present appeal is somewhat unusual in that most cases involve
claims that the lower court entered insufficient findings or inadequate
-11-

findings based upon the record.

In the instant case, however, the

court has entered an abundance of findings many of which would be
leemed evidentiary findings as opposed to findings of ultimate facts.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "findings should be limited to
the ultimate facts." Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 1080, 1082 (1977).
"Ultimate facts are the facts which are necessary to determine the
issues in the case, as distinguished from the evidentiary facts
supporting them." Galvan v. Miller, 445 P.2d 961 (N.M.

1968).

Thus, in the instant case not only did the lower court enter a
lumber of ultimate facts but also entered a large number of evidentiary
facts thereby making it more difficult to sort and sift the relevant
inquiry.

In any event, however, both these evidentiary facts and

ultimate facts found by the lower court show that Sampson was involved
in a commercial battle both for himself and for his clients for the
protection of assets and to preserve the limited partnerships.

As

noted in the Leigh Furniture and Carpet case an improper purpose can
only be found "where it can be shown that the actor's predominant
purpose was to injure the plaintiff." 657 P.2d at 307.
In rejecting a finding of improper purpose in the Leigh Furniture
case the Utah Supreme Court stated the following:
As noted earlier, there is substantial evidence
that the Leigh corporation deliberately injured Isom's
economic relations. But that injury was not an end in
itself. It was an intermediate step toward achieving
the long-range financial goal of profitably reselling
the building free of Isom's interest. Because that
economic interest seems to have been controlling, we
must conclude that the evidence in this case would not
support a jury finding that the corporation's
predominant purpose was to injure or ruin Isom's
business merely for the sake of injury alone. Id. at
308. (Emphasis added).
It is therefore respectfully submitted that even if it is assumed
-12-

arguendo that Sampson had a vendetta to oust Richins and to take
complete control of the limited partnerships that such purpose was no.
different than that in the Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co, case which
the Utah Supreme Court found was not improper.

For this reason,

therefore, the lower court erred in concluding that Sampson's efforts
could be classified as a "improper purpose" under the tort of
interference with contract.
B.

The Lower Court Erred in Concluding
That Sampson Utilized Improper Means
During His Relationship With the Limited
Partnerships.

Sampson in his opening brief contended that the lower court also
erred in categorizing his conduct as an improper means.
opening Brief, pp.
their brief.

34-40).

(Appellant's

Respondents replied to this argument in

(Respondents' Brief, pp.

35-41).

Respondents have,

however, both misinterpreted the legal standards and the facts of this
case in making their retort.
The Supreme Court in Leigh Furniture stated that to recover
damages under the common-law cause of intentional interference with
prospective economic relations the plaintiff must prove (1) that the
defendant intentionally interferred with the plaintiff's existing or
potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by an
improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff.

657 P.2d at 304.

Respondents have confused the element of improper means with the
element of intentional interference.

In Respondents' brief they state

that six acts of the defendants in the Leigh Furniture case constituted
the "improper means of interference".

(Respondents' Brief, p. 36).

They then quote from page 306 of the opinion in which the Utah Supreme
Court stated that the cumulative effect of these various acts resulted
-13-

in interference.

(Respondents1 Brief, p. 37).

If the Leigh Furniture case is examined, however, it is seen that
the quotation upon which Respondents rely deals with the question as to
the first element of whether the defendants intentionally interferred
with the plaintiff's existing or potential economic relations.
Subdivision (c) of the opinion beginning on page 305 is entitled
"Evidence of Intentional Interference and Causation".

The discussion

relied upon by the respondents, therefore, only goes to the issue as to
whether conduct occurred which caused interference with a business
relationship.

The court's discussion as to "improper means" does not

occur until some three pages later.

(Id. at 308-11).

Appellant Sampson readily admits that the actions which occurred
during this transaction satisfied the first element of the test in that
he intentionally interferred with the respondents1 existing or
potential economic relations.

All of the actions which are listed in

Respondents1 brief either directly or indirectly had some effect upon
the economic relations of Respondents.

(Respondents' Brief, pp.

38-40).
The lower court listed nine acts which it believed constituted
improper means as defined in the Leigh Furniture case.
Appellant's opening Brief, pp.
list to some 22 acts.

34-35).

(See,

Respondents have expanded this

(Respondents' Brief, pp.

37-40).

Sampson would

submit that the lower court's own characterization of the improper acts
should be controlling since the lower court did not necessarily have to
believe that every alleged wrong of Sampson constituted an improper
means.

However, even if it is assumed arguendo that all of the acts

listed by the respondents constituted the improper means in this case

-14-

they are still insufficient to qualify under the Leigh Furniture
criteria.
The Utah Supreme Court defined improper means as follows:
The alternative requirement of improper means is
satisfied where the means used to interfer with a
party's economic relations are contrary to law, such as
violations of statutes, regulations, or recognized
common law rules. Such acts are illegal or tortious in
themselves and hence are clearly "improper" means of
interference. . . . "Commonly included among improper
means are violence, threats or other intimidation,
deceit or misrepresentation, bribery, unfounded
litigation, defamation, or disparaging falsehood."
Means may also be improper or wrongful because they
violate "an established standard of a trade or
profession." Id. at 308 (Citations omitted).
In addition, the Supreme Court also stated that the absence of
"good faith" is another element to consider when evaluating the conduct
of a party.

The decision of the Utah Supreme Court utilizing the

concept of good faith is in accordance with the numerous authorities
cited by Appellant in his opening brief.
36-39).

(Appellant's Brief, pp.

Respondents' attempt to answer the good faith argument

advanced by Sampson by stating that (1) good faith is not applicable to
a cumulative number of acts; (2) "the district court did in fact make
several references to Sampson's supposed absence of malice in arriving
at its conclusion that Sampson used a series of improper means to take
control of the limited partnerships;" (3) that "good faith" is nothing
more than a claim of legal privilege which was not pled." (Respondents'
Brief, p. 41).
As to these contentions Respondents cited no authority to the
effect that good faith should not be examined as to each alleged act
regardless of the number of acts supposedly constituting an improper
means.

The second grounds alleged by Respondents is totally
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incomprehensible by Appellant in that it would seem to support
Sampson's position that he had no malice in his actions-

Finally, the

element of "good faith" is not the same as the affirmative defense of
privilege which is an affirmative defense once the acts charged would
be tortious on the part of an unprivileged defendant.

657 P.2d at 304.

It is the burden of the asserting party to show that the alleged
tortfeasor acted in bad faith and in a malicious manner.
(Institutional Food v. Golden State Strawberries, 587 F. Supp.
(D.Mo.

1105

1983).

Examining those reasons given by the lower court for concluding an
improper means existed (see, Appellant's Brief, pp.

34-35) and even

examining the expanded list of the respondents (Respondents' Brief, pp.
37-40) shows that the alleged violations were either (1) not sufficient
conduct to constitute an improper means as defined in the Leigh
Furniture case; (2) actions which had no direct causal interference
with the economic relations of the respondents; or (3) actions which
were undertaken in good faith for the protection of Sampson's clients
and investors.

In fact, if this Court examines the claims of

Respondents as to the alleged improper acts it will find that the
majority of them occurred during various legal proceedings in which
Sampson, as found by the lower court, sincerely believed he had the
right to do what he was doing and had court approval to do so.
Thus, Respondents' assertions that the conduct in the Leigh
Furniture case is parallel to that of the instant case is an incorrect
statement.

In Leigh there was a clear and consistent pattern on the

part of the defendant to eliminate the business of the plaintiff for no
other reason than to gain back the building for its own economic use.
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In the instant case, quite the contrary, the respondents had already
placed the assets of the limited partnerships in serious jeopardy and
Sampson along with others was attempting to salvage the operations
before any further catastrophies occurred.

In addition, the

respondents had clearly bowed out of the fracas by giving notices of
withdrawal and by essentially telling the limited partners that they
were on their own.
These circumstances as factually found by the lower court do not
give rise to the legal conclusion that Sampson exercised improper means
in attempting to salvage the limited partnership.

If Sampson's actions

are deemed improper then essentially every stockholder takeover or
attempted merger of a corporation would also be called improper because
of the adversarial relation which two competitors place themselves in
while attempting to garner the support of shareholders or other voting
members.

In addition, if any court proceeding is later determined to

be invalid or any action declared invalid when based upon a sincere
good faith belief of statutory authority then literally hundreds of
thousands of acts dealing with corporations and other businesses each
year would also be deemed predatory.

Obviously, the Utah Supreme Court

and other courts in the country before permitting a plaintiff to
recover under the theory of tortious interference require a much
greater showing than the battles of the marketplace.

Here, the lower

court clearly erred in concluding to the contrary.
C.

The Lower Court Erred in Concluding
That the Actions of Sampson Caused
Injury to the Defendants.

In Sampson's opening brief he contended that the finding of the
lower court of causal injury was incorrect because of two factors: (1)
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that the contracts were terminable at will and (2) defendants failed to
show that but for Sampson's interference the ventures would have been
successful.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.

40-44).

Respondents argue that

Sampson's conduct was a substantial factor in causing injury to the
respondents and that therefore the doctrine of concurrent negligence is
applicable (Respondents' Brief, pp.

43-45); and second, even if

application of the "but for" test is required Sampson's conduct was the
proximate cause of injury to the defendants.
45-49).

(Respondents' Brief, pp.

The arguments of Respondents are flawed with illogical and

factual deficiencies.
First, Respondents contend that the lower court concluded that it
was a combination of both the conduct of Respondents and Sampson which
caused the damages in this lawsuit.

Respondents then argue that both

parties were the concurrent causes of the complained injuries and
therefore under the doctrine of concurrent negligence Sampson is solely
liable for the injuries suffered.

(Respondents' Brief, pp.

44-45).

Effectively, therefore, Respondents are conceding that their
mismanagement and other actions were an equal force in the demise of
the various limited partnerships.

If a third party were suing both

Richins and Sampson then the concurrent negligence rule cited by
Respondents would be applicable since it is fundamental that where the
separate negligent acts of two defendants concur and it appears that
the plaintiff would not have been injured but for the concurrence of
both then both defendants are jointly liable.

However, this is not a

case of concurrent liability as beween the parties and a third innocent
party but is a case between the plaintiffs and the defendants.
the doctrine of comparative negligence under Utah law would be
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Thus,

applicable in apportioning the degree of fault by each of the parties
in this lawsuit.
Acculog, Inc.

(Section 78-27-37, et. seg.

supp.

1986).

See,

v. Peterson, 692 P.2d 728 (Utah 1984) (comparative

negligence becomes a defense for a defendant where plaintiff's
negligent conduct is a contributing factor in causing injury).
Under the doctrine of comparative negligence if, as Respondents
contend, the actions of Sampson and Respondents were concurrent causes
of the complained-of injuries then neither party could recover from the
other for injuries suffered.

Section 78-27-38, U.C.A.

It is therefore

unnecessary under the very arguments advanced by Respondents to examine
the conduct of Sampson individually in that the concurrent fault of
both parties would preclude the damages now awarded.
The respondents also address the "but for" argument raised in
Appellant's opening brief.

They apparently do not contest the legal

authority cited by Appellant.

Instead, Respondents contend that the

terminable nature of the contracts and the financial condition of the
limited partnerships when Sampson entered the scene are insufficient
reasons to eliminate the causal connection which the lower court found.
(Respondents' Brief, pp.

46-47).

Sampson after reviewing the Restatement of Torts section cited by
Respondents agrees that the issue of "at will" termination is normally
one properly of damages rather than causation.

However, the very

flimsy nature of the limited partnerships belie any claim by
Respondents that all of the limited pastners would have stayed with
Richins bur for Sampson.

Thus, the terminable nature of these

agreements affects both proximate causation and damages.
The second argument raised by Respondents concerns the financial
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stability of the partnership at the time Sampson undertook his initial
representation.

Respondents state, "Even charitably assuming for

purposes of argument that the limited partnerships were in fact
suffering from 'financial instability1 on the date Sampson first
appeared on the scene" the limited partnerships had been "solvent,
viable entities for over seven years by the time Sampson first began
tampering with their affairs." (Respondents1 Brief, p. 47).
The statement of the respondents is not supported by the record
references given in their brief nor is it supported by the factual
findings upon which they now rely.

There can be no question but that

at the time Sampson first entered the fracas the limited partnerships
were all in serious financial difficulty.

A brief review of some of

the findings and conclusions of the lower court shows this financial
instability.
[T]he existing problems began to surface in May,
1980, [when] some limited partners began to lose trust
and confidence in Richins to the point that those
limited partnership who were still actively concerned
about their investments refused to pay over to Richins
any further funds either on past or current assessments
and began to consider the need to seek the advice of
counsel with respect to their various partnership
interests. (R. 2103)
On June 22, 1979 Richins was advised by attorney
Baker for Agricultural Services that notice of
non-payment on installment contracts due on irrigation
contracts for Shoshone, Randlett, and Young at the
Idaho State Bank had been issued. . . . (R. 2104).
On September 12, 1979 notice was given that a
$300,000 loan by Utah Mortgage to RFC and assigned to
Northwest National Life and guaranteed by Paul and
Shari Richins was in default and if payments were not
made in full by September 25, a foreclosure proceeding
would be started. (R. 2105).
On November 20, 1979 two lien claims were filed by
the Sages against Shoshone, RFC and Richins for over
$30,000 which had gone to judgments later. (Id.).
-20-

At a Taber Partnership meeting on April 3, 1980,
it was reported that some RFC checks to PCA had been
returned for insufficient funds. (R. 2106).
Two judgment liens were made of record, one on
August 17, 1979 by Rex Clemmons for $2,340 and one on
October 5, 1979 by Lemon White Drilling for $3,264.
(Id.).
At the May 29, 1980 meeting the evidence
established that mention was made that the $17,600
payment due Glenn in September, 1979, had not been
paid; that from $30,000 to $50,000 would be needed to
complete the Minter-Wilson wells; that a total of
$240,000 was needed to meet current Catlow Valley
obligations and that as Richins did not have such
money, the limited partners were the only source for
it. . . . (R. 2107).
Dissatisfaction of Richins1 handling of the
partnership affairs was voiced in May, 1980. This
coupled with other problems extant in 1980, including a
lack of meaningful information from the general
partner, the existence of judgments, troublesome tax
problems, the state securities commission's
investigations, the revocation of RFC's certificate of
authority in Oregon, the failure of many limited
partners to pay their assessments and Richins1 failure
to do anything about it, and Richins' invitation to the
Catlow Valley partners at the May 29, 1980 meeting to
replace him, all added up to a compelling reason for
the partnerships to so act as provided in the
agreement. (R. 2116-17).
As stated in prior findings, by May, 1980, Richins
and his companies had become confronted with
substantial financial problems, as well as others
likewise mentioned elsewhere, which were of such
magnitude that success in overcoming them seemed
doubtful. (R. 2141-42).
I do not find that the evidence preponderates
proving that, but for Sampson's statements to the
investors that such advances were not debts owed to the
partners, the partnerships would have in fact repaid
the amount of such advances in full as shown in the
partnership books and records, or indeed any part
thereof. (R. 2149).
The record in summary thus shows that in May,
1980, Richins and his companies had control of at least
25 limited farm partnerships with assets and
liabilities of such a nature that they had serious
-21-

financial problems in May, 1980, when Sampson first
became involved, (R. 2158).
By May, 1980, Richins had so mismanaged
partnership affairs that they did not have funds to pay
installments owed to RFC, so RFC could not pay its
installment obligations to the contract sellers.
Substantial judgments were obtained for failure to pay
partnership obligations. Some partners were angry
because of Richins1 failure to follow the partnership
agreements upon assessment and failure to pay; to give
an annual audited report to each; to have the
properties appraised by a qualified appraiser and give
the partners a report on the value of their holdings,
to advise them regarding advances and obligations with
respect thereto; and to keep them advised of the
problems that develop(R. 2273).
With the preceding examples together with those noted in
Appellant's opening brief it is difficult to understand how Respondents
can claim that the limited partnerships had been "solvent, viable
entities until Sampson first began tampering with their affairs,"
Likewise, Respondents' statement that while the properties were
under the supervision of the Richtron companies that none of them were
ever foreclosed upon is equally unsupported by the record.

To the

contrary, the findings cited by Respondents show that the lower court
had no evidence submitted by either party as to the specifics of the
foreclosures.

The court stated on several occasions that it had no way

of knowing the disposition of the properties or the status of the funds
received from such property.

(R.

2128-29, 2228).

In addition, since

the respondents immediately attempted to "bail out" almost as soon as
Sampson entered the picture the fact that Sampson could not salvage the
dilapidated condition of these partnerships cannot be attributed solely
to Sampson's conduct.

Essentially, therefore, the evidence as to

foreclosures proves nothing as to either party.
Next, Respondents contend that it was solely the conduct of
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Sampson which prevented the limited partners from paying their pro rata
proportion of expenses.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.

47-48).

Sampson

would refer this Court to the previous quotations above relating to
Richins' failure to obtain contributions in 1979 and 1980.

In

addition, the lower court specifically found that the erroneous
statements of Sampson concerning mark-ups and other claims had no
effect upon the payment by the limited partners.

The court stated:

I do not find that the evidence preponderates in
proving that, but for Sampson's statements to the
investors that such advances were not debts owed to the
partners, the partnerships would have in fact repaid
the amount of such advances in full as shown in the
partnership books and records, or indeed any part
thereof. (R. 2149).
Respondents1 statement concerning the "long standing viability of the
limited partnerships and their ability to obtain all required operating
capital from the investors" is again a complete misstatement of the
findings of the lower court.
Respondents argue that because a settlement agreement has been
tentatively reached in May of 1980 for $700,000 it is a reasonable
inference that the going concern value of the limited partnership was
substantial.

(Respondents' Brief, p.

48). Had the respondents

gracefully bowed out in May of 1980 and allowed Sampson to operate the
partnerships without interference, then the argument made by
Respondents would have some relevance.

However, Respondents continued

to engage in a virtual four-year proxy battle with Sampson thereby
destroying any inherent value that a peaceful take-over would have had.
It can be just as easily said that had the respondents not interferred
with Sampson's management and efforts to revitalize the faltering
partnerships, that the operation would have been successful and all of
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the parties would have come out ahead.

Instead, however, the battle

raging between the two entities continued to drain each of their
resources together with being their ability to confront all of the
problems facing the partnerships prior to Sampson's arrival.

It cannot

be said with the legal certainty required that the actions of Sampson
caused the financial demise of these partnerships in 1986 after the
opposition of Respondents during the prior five-year period.
Finally, Respondents contend that the quotations in Sampson's
opening brief only referred to damages inflicted upon Richtron
Financial and not to the other entities.

(Respondents' Brief, p. 49).

Again, this statement is entirely incorrect since the court in those
findings (listed on pages 40 and 41 of Appellant's Brief) was speaking
both in terms of RFC, the general partners, and Richins as an
individual.

In addition, the other quotations made in this Brief

clearly address all of the individual Respondents and their unstable
financial condition.
It is impossible to read the findings of the lower court and to
then agree with the concluding statement of Respondents that "the
record establishes that but for Sampson's seizure of the limited
partnerships, the Richtron companies would have obtained the various
economic benefits embodied by the limited partnership agreements."
(Respondents' Brief, p.

49). Further discussion as to this

misstatement is not required.
D.

The Lower Court Erred in Concluding
that the Affirmative Defenses of Waiver
and Estoppel were not Applicable to the
Defendants in this Case.

Appellant in his opening brief contended that the lower court
failed to legally conclude that the affirmative defenses of waiver and
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estoppel had been established.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.

44-47).

Respondents simply retorted that Sampson had failed to marshall all
evidence relevant to the findings and therefore appellate review cannot
be undertaken.

(Respondents1 Brief, pp.

49-50).

Again, Respondents are mistaken as to their notion of the
"marshalling of evidence" rule.

Sampson is not contesting any factual

finding as to what occurred in this case but is contesting the legal
conclusion based upon such findings.

It is Sampson's belief that the

factual findings entered by the court as to the conduct of the
respondents clearly justifies a legal conclusion of waiver and
estoppel.
It would serve no useful purpose of marshall additional evidence
of factual support for these defenses since the lower court's factual
findings have adequately provided a sufficient foundation for legal
review.

The very effort of the respondents to continuously withdraw

from the partnership arrangement is the very type of factual context
that these legal doctrines are based upon.

As observed by the lower

court "one wonders what Richins thought the partnerships were expected
to do.

The Richtron general partners' withdrawal had left them with an

uncertain future." (R.

2186).

Since Respondents have failed to address these factual arguments
further discussion is unnecessary.
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ITS AWARD OF DAMAGES
IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS.
A.

The Factual Findings of the Lower
Court do not Justify the Imposition
of $250,000 as Consequential Damages.

Appellant in his opening brief contended that the findings of the
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lower court do not justify the imposition of a $250,000 award of
damages.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.

47-54).

Respondents contend that

damages were proper because (1) the absence of the complete trial
record is fatal to Sampson's challenge of damages and (2) the award is
consistent with applicable law and abundantly supported by the existing
record on appeal.

Both of these arguments will now be addressed.

Sampson is solely relying upon the findings of the lower court for
his assertion that the factual findings do not justify the legal
conclusion of $250,000 damages.

While the factual findings of the

lower court are necessarily based upon the evidence which was
introduced at trial, it is not the contention of Sampson that a review
of such evidence is now required.

Thus, any attempt by Respondents to

convert this appeal to a sufficiency of evidence case is a fruitless
venture.
This is not the type of case in which an award of a fixed sum of
damages is being appealed as to the insufficiency of the supporting
record.

For example, if a trial court awarded a plaintiff $40,000 for

loss of wages the defendant could claim that the evidence adduced at
trial did not support the $40,000 award.

In such an instance the

complete record would be imperative for appellate review.
The present appeal is analogous to a situation in which the lower
court awards $40,000 for lost wages in its judgment and conclusions of
law with no factual findings to support such judgment that any lost
wages occurred or any factual finding as to how such wages were
computed.

In these type of instances the underlying record is not

required since only the factual findings and conclusions of law and
judgment are needed for review.

State v. Deplonty, 749 P.2d 621 (Utah
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1987).

Thus, the "marshalling of evidence" argument again advanced by

Respondents is not applicable to Appellant's present claim.
Next, Respondents argue that the award of consequential damages is
consistent with applicable law.

(Respondents1 Brief, pp.

52-54).

Respondents do not address the problem raised initially by Appellant
that the lower court simply failed to give any factual road map as to
the composition of the $250,000 award.

It is elementary that the

findings of fact of a lower court must provide a basis for determining
whether there is a rational basis for the award of damages.

Proper

findings are essential to enable a reviewing court to perform its
function of assuring that the findings support the judgment.

Romrell

v. Zions Bank, 611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980).
The Utah Supreme Court in describing the requirement of findings
stated:
The importance of complete, accurate and
consistent findings of fact in a case tried by a judge
is essential to the resolution of dispute under the
proper rule of law. To that end the findings should be
sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary
facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate
conclusions on each factual issue was reached. Rucker
v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979).
More recently the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Rule 52(a) requires that a trial court finds facts
specially in all actions tried upon the facts without a
jury. Such findings of fact must clearly indicate the
"mind of the court," and must resolve all issues of
material fact necessary to justify the conclusions of
law and judgment entered thereon. Furthermore, failure
of a trial court to enter adequate findings requires
the judgment to be vacated. Parks v. Zions First
National Bank, 673 P.2d 599, 601 (Utah 1983).
It is submitted that the lower court in this case failed to follow
this requirement.

It is pure speculation on the part of Respondents

that the $250,000 consisted of money which was left in the bank account
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of Sampson after October 29, 1984.

(Respondents' Brief, pp.

54-56).

In the first place, if this in fact were the measure of damages it
would be $288,597 and not the even figure of $250,000.

Second, while

the final accounting may have occurred on October 29, 1984 it was not
until January 5, 1985 that Richins obtained an order from Judge Cornaby
vacating his two prior orders which gave Sampson the right to control
the partnership.

(R.

2185).

Thus, if any date was to have any

relevance at all when Sampson ceased having legal authority to operate
the corporation it would have been the January date to which no
evidence was ever offered.
Next, the lower court specifically rejected Respondents'
contention that Sampson "and twelve people" ended up with all of the
assets of the limited partnerships.

The court stated:

[N]o evidence was placed in the record
establishing that such was in fact the case, but if so,
absent any such evidence, I cannot consider this
statement [closing argument of Respondents' counsel] as
a factor upon which this decision can be made. I have
repeatedly noted the absence of evidence as to what
finally happened to the partnerships and their
properties other than a schedule showing only the dates
upon which foreclosures presumably took place. Id.
at 2265-2266.
The court also specifically denied Respondents' claim for an
accounting and while the court noted that the record contained no
evidence as to what happened to the partnerships and their properties
the court would not allow such curiosity to further prolong a decision
in this case.

(R.

2277).

Thus, the lower court was obviously not

convinced that whatever money remained in the Sampson accounts in the
latter part of 1984 and the early part of 1985 was for the benefit of
Respondents and essentially concluded that all the money had been used
in one way or another on behalf of the limited partnerships.
-28-

The explanation given by the Respondents is in direct
contradiction to that given by the lower court itself in the post-trial
motions which is contained in the Appendix to the opening brief.
Certainly, it would have been an easy matter for the lower court to
have stated the composition of the amount had it been so simple as the
remaining balance in a bank account on a given date.

Instead, the

court went through its analogy of an automobile tort case and general
damages obtained from a jury.

Such analogy certainly would have not

been required had the explanation offered by Respondents been the true
"mind of the court".
Finally, the award of the sum remaining in the bank accounts would
be equivalent of conceding that the respondents were entitled to
receive all of the proceeds and assets gathered by Sampson during his
operation of the limited partnerships.

As is noted by the respondents

in their cross appeal, the lower court specifically rejected this
notion and refused to award them damages for the amounts collected and
disbursed by Sampson during his control of the limited partnerships.
(Respondents1 Brief, pp.

65-68).

Thus, the $250,000 figure has no

basis in the findings of the court.
Next, Respondents contend that the award of "consequential"
damages is of a general nature and did not require either the pleading
or proof previously asserted by Sampson in his opening brief.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.

52-54; Respondents1 Brief, pp.

52-53).

The

arguments advanced by Respondents are clearly and unequivocably dead
wrong.
The Restatement of Torts 2d §774A uses the term "pecuniary" loss
and "consequential" loss in defining the liability for damages.
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Respondents acknowledge that "pecuniary" loss is a special damage.
This acknowledgement is correct since normally "pecuniary" damages are
those which can be accurately estimated such as loss of wages, costs of
medical attendance, etc. whereas "non-pecuniary" damages are those
which depend on the enlightened judgment of an impartial court or jury
such as damages for pain, suffering, loss of reputation, etc,
C.J.S.

§2 Damages, p.

25

622.

Respondents then argue that since pecuniary losses are special
then consequential losses must necessarily be general.
is incorrect.

This argument

"Consequential" damages have been defined as follows:

Consequential damages are such as are not produced
without the concurrence of some other event
attributable to the same origin or cause; such damage,
loss, or injury as does not flow directly and
immediately from the act of the party, but only from
the consequences or results of such act. The term may
include damage which is so remote as to not be
actionable. It has also been defined as synonomous
with the term "special damages". 25 C.J.S. §2
Damages, p. 617 (Emphasis added).
Numerous courts have also recognized that "consequential" damages
are merely a form of special damages which must be proven with
certainty.
219 (N.C.

In Piedmont Plastics, Inc.
App.

v. Mize Co., Inc., 293 S.E.2d

1982) the court stated:

Incidental and consequential damages are "special
damages," those which do not necessarily result from
the wrong. Special damages "must be pleaded, and the
facts giving rise to [them] must be alleged so as to
fairly inform the defendant of the scope of plaintiff's
demand." An instruction on special damages is
appropriate, however, only when such damages are
particularly alleged in the complaint and the
allegation is sustained by the evidence. Id. at 223
(citations omitted).
See also, Hycel, Inc.
193 (D.

Tex.

v. American Airlines, Inc., 328 F. Supp.

1971) ("consequential damages are synonymous with
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190,

special damages").
Normally, in order for consequential damages to be awarded it is
necessary to show that the loss which was incurred was within the
contemplation of the parties to the contract at the time it was made.
This requirement has been eliminated by the Restatement of Torts 2d
provided that the consequential damages were legally caused by the
defendant's interference.

See, §774A, Comment d. The fact that such

damages do not need to be in contemplation of the parties, however,
does not change the nature of the damages as special rather than
general.

Clark v. Ferro Corp., 237 F. Supp.

230, 238 (D.

Tenn.

1964); Seekinqs v. Jimmy GMC of Tucson, Inc., 638 P.2d 210, 215 (Ariz.
1982) .
Thus, in cases involving torts of intentional interference with
contracts claims made under Subsection (a) and (b) of the Restatement
of Torts 2d §774A damages must be pled and proved specially since there
is no provision *for general damages to be awarded in those instances.
The lower court's characterization of the $250,oOO as equivalent to
pain and suffering in a jury case was clearly a misconception of the
law.
Finally, Sampson has no dispute with the authorities cited by
Respondents concerning the certainty of damages.
p.

(Respondents' Brief,

54). These cases, however, are completely inapplicable to the

facts of this case since all of the case cited by Respondents involve
instances where the fact of special damages had been established but
the amount of damages was uncertain because of various evidentiary
problems.

Here, neither the court nor the respondents can show what

consequential damages were being awarded so that the question of
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computing the amount never comes into play.
For these reasons, therefore, the award by the lower court of
$250,000 as consequential damages was incorrect and should be vacated.
B.

The Lower Court Erred
Damages to Richtron,
for their Respective
Interests in Several

in Awarding
Inc. and to RFC
Limited Partnership
Farm Properties.

Sampson in his opening brief maintained that the award of some
$35,000 to RFC and to Richtron, Inc. for their interest as limited
partners was erroneous.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.

54-56).

Respondents

retort that there was some evidentiary basis contained in the findings
supporting the lower court's conclusion.

(Respondents' Brief, pp.

56-57).
The reply of Respondents does not address the arguments raised by
Sampson.

First, even the evidence relied upon by Respondents only

concerns a portion of the total $35,&00 award.

Second, it was the

respondents' burden, not Sampson's, to show damages which included
proof that the value of the limited partnerships was worthless at the
time of trial and that they had therefore suffered the loss of their
capital contribution.
Finally, Respondents do not even address the contention that
Richins waived any claim he may now have as to the interest of the
limited partnerships when he failed, as a general partner, to properly
terminate and wind up the affairs of those interests.

Richins should

not be allowed a preferential treatment over the other limited partners
involved in this case especially since Richins had the power to
preserve and protect his interests in these limited partnerships.

Had

Sampson's efforts succeeded and the venture been successful certainly
these limited pastnerships would have been entitled to no more than the
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others.
For these reasons, therefore, the approximate $35,000 award to
Richins Financial and Richtron, Inc. should be vacated.
CROSS APPEAL
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN DECLINING
TO IMPOSE PUNITIVE DAMAGES AGAINST SAMPSON.
In Respondents1 Cross Appeal they contend that the lower court
erred in failing to award any punitive damages against Sampson.
(Respondents' Brief, pp.

57-64).

They note that the lower court

failed to make such award "despite the fact that it identified and
enumerated dozens of facts establishing Sampson's reckless disregard
for the rights of the Richins parties." Respondents then list some
twenty-six such facts and circumstances justifying the imposition of an
award.

(Respondents' Brief, pp.

59-63).

Before proceeding into the merits of Respondents' arguments a
procedural note should be made.

The Respondents are now arguing that

the findings of the lower court do not support the legal conclusion of
punitive damages.

Since Respondents did not designate any additional

portions of the record than those designated by Sampson, the
respondents must necessarily rely upon the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of law for its present contentions concerning not only
punitive damages but the other damage claims in the remainder of their
brief.
Thus, as noted earlier in this brief, Respondents scream loudly
about the failure of Sampson to designate the entire record and to
marshall the evidence but in no way attempt to distinguish their claims
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of damages when an incomplete record also exists.

It is submitted,

therefore, that this is additional proof that the respondents
themselves do not believe that an underlying record is necessary in
this case, either as to their own claims or as to the claims of
Sampson, and that if their contentions are correct then both the appeal
and the cross appeal must necessarily fail equally in that no logical
distinction can be made.
The award of punitive damages is an extraordinary event which
should only occur in extremely limited situations.

"Although punitive

damages may be awarded in an appropriate case, the general rule is that
only compensatory damages are appropriate and that punitive damages may
be awarded only in exceptional cases." Behrens v. Raleigh Hills
Hospital, Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1186 (Utah 1983).
should be imposed cautiously.

Punitive damages

Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 771

(Utah 1985).
"Punitive damages are not awarded for mere inadvertence, mistake,
errors of judgment and the like, which constitute ordinary negligence."
Restatement (2d) of Torts, §908, Comment b at 465 (1979); C.F.
v. D & C Builders, 452 P.2d 325 (Utah 1969).

Palombi

In addition, punitive

damages cannot be awarded for mere breach of contract unless the breach
amounts to an independent tort.

Highland Construction Co.

v. Union

Pacific Railway Co., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984); Jorgensen v. John Clay
& Co., 660 P.2d 229 (Utah 1983).
An award of punitive damages cannot stand unless compensatory
damages are also shown.

Atkin, Wright & Miles v. Mountain States

Telephone, 709 P.2d 330 (Utah 1985).

Punitive damages "are not

intended as additional compensation to a plaintiff, and must, if
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awarded, serve a societal interest of punishing and deterring
outrageous and malicious conduct which is not likely to be deterred by
other means." Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., 675 P.2d 1179,
1186 (Utah 1983).

Before punitive damages may be awarded, the

plaintiff must prove conduct that is willful and malicious, First
Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J.

Feed Yards, Inc., 653 P.2d 591, 598

(Utah 1982); or that manifests and knowing and reckless indifference
and disregard towards the rights of others.

Branch v. Western

Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 277-78 (Utah 1982).
"The jury (or other factfinder) has 'a broad discretion1 in
weighing the various factors and arriving at its determination of an
appropriate award of punitive damages." Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co.
v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 312 (Utah 1982).

Punitive damages are not

properly given against one who acts in good faith under an erroneous
sense of duty.

U.S.

695 P.2d 1031 (Wyo.

Through Farmers Home Administration v. Redland,
1985).

"One is not liable for exemplary damages

if he acts in good faith under an erroneous sense of duty or right,
without any intention to oppress or defraud or without any actual
oppression or indignity." 22 Am.Jur.2d §778, Damages, p.

831-32.

It should be observed that in all the cases cited by Respondents
as well as cases independently researched by Appellant, there have been
no instances where an appellate court has imposed punitive damages when
such imposition was initially rejected by the fact finder.

Thus, for

Respondents to prevail in their claim of punitive damages it will be
necessary for Respondents to convince this Court that the trial judge's
conclusions of good faith and lack of willful misconduct is not
supported by the factual findings supporting such conclusions.
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Appellant Sampson submits that a review of the lower court's decision
as to punitive damages shows that such conclusions were properly based
upon an analysis of the events and that the decision of the lower court
should therefore not be disturbed.
The lower court in Findings of Fact No,

118 extensively examined

the factual basis for the award of punitive damages.

The court

examined the various legal rulings which supported Sampson's authority
as well as the actions of the respondents in abandoning and turning
over complete control of the entities to Sampson during various periods
of time.

The court entered the following finding to justify its

conclusion that the type of willful and malicious conduct necessary for
punitive damages was simply not present in this case.

The court

stated:
One wonders what Richins thought the partnerships
were expected to do. The Richtron general partners'
withdrawal had left them with an undercertain future.
Many limited partners had sought legal advice from
Sampson and he gave it to them. The fact that he erred
in the advice given them does not render his actions
malicious. They, too, could read and write, and a
simple sentence in the partnership agreement gave them
the authority by simple vote to remove the general
partner, elect a new one and carry on the business of
the partnerships. Or, they could have petitioned the
Court to terminate the partnerships and wind up its
affairs. They did neither. They had Sampson. When
this case was filed February 11, 1981, Richins could
have requested a restraining order against Sampson's
interference with partnership affairs. Instead, no
doubt influenced by continued settlement negotiations,
he entered into a stipulation delaying the filing of
any responsive pleading. An answer and counterclaim
finally made it to the court in July, 1982.
The court then made the following comments with reference to Sampson's.
state of mind:
By my comments in this Finding it is not my intent
to point the finger of blame at Richins and exonerate
Sampson, for I have already made my findings of his
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wrongdoing, but I think it necessary to view Richins•
role in judging Sampson's conduct, in considering the
claim for punitive damages, and in doing so it is my
opinion that as wrong as Sampson was in many of the
things he did, I think he believed himself to be right
in doing what he did and the way he did them. He
should have known the law, but I do not believe he
intentionally violated it. For almost six months he
worked amicably with Richins on settlement. When that
failed, by powers of attorney he got proxies to vote
the limited partners1 interests. He did so, electing
his PC general partner. When that was said to be
contrary to law, he voted AG Management in as general
partner and so operated. By the time Judge Palmer
ruled that illegal, Sampson was able to carry on under
a color of authority by receipt of an IRS Certificate
of Sale, followed by two favorable rulings by Judge
Cornaby until the IRS sale was voided in May, 1984, by
a federal court order.
In characterizing the type of conduct in this case the court stated:
The bitterness and contentions that developed and
existed between the two men was long and drawn out and
led to prolonged controversies which had its roots in
serious problems already existing before Sampson
entered the ring. But I do not believe the evidence
preponderates in establishing the type of willful and
malicious conduct, nor the lessened type, required by
our Supreme Court decisions to justify or support an
award of punitive damages and I so find. (R.
2186-88). (Emphasis added). See also, Conclusion of
Law No. 76 (R. 2249) .
The above-quoted Finding of the lower court effectively answers
the majority of those items now listed by the respondents as
constituting predatory conduct.

The Findings of the court also negates

Respondents1 contention that Sampsons1 actions showed a knowing and
reckless indifference and disregard for the rights of others.

The

Findings, to the contrary, shows that while Sampson made many mistakes
in judgment during the course of these proceedings, he did so in order
to protect the financial investments of the limited partners and always
acted in good faith via a court order or other legal badge of
authority.

The contrary positions taken by Respondents throughout this
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affair hardly gives them the right to complain of Sampson's conduct
since their conduct was much more recklessly indifferent towards the
rights of the limited partners when they essentially abandoned them and
left them to their own devices.
For these reasons, the decision of the lower court in refusing to
award punitive damages must affirmed.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
AWARD RICHTRON, INC. AND RICHTRON GENERAL
THE FULL AMOUNT COLLECTED AND DISBURSED BY
SAMPSON DURING HIS CONTROL OF THE LIMITED
PARTNERSHIPS.
On cross appeal, Respondents argue that the lower court should
have credited to them all of the monies received by Sampson between
June of 1980 and November of 1982.

It is unknown why Respondents have

chosen this time period for their claim since Sampson continued to
operate the company well into 1985 and collected much more than the
$645,000 now requested by Respondents.

(R.

2262-67).

The lower court, as previously mentioned, found that Sampson
during this entire period of time was acting as a general partner on
behalf of the limited partners under one legal basis or another and
that the funds received by Sampson were properly paid on behalf of the
limited partnership ventures.

(R.

2267).

Thus, Respondents are now

demanding that they be given a judgment for the entire proceeds during
this 28-month period even though they do not contest (nor can they
contest without the record) the finding of the lower court that such
funds were properly paid for partnership expenses.
Respondents also fail to address the problems created by their own
conduct.

It is to be remembered, for example, that Richins formally
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withdrew as general partner from all of the entities by January 1981.
(R.

2184).

Moreover, Richins consented to Sampson's role in the

collection of funds and for many months worked with Sampson in their
attempt to settle the problems surrounding the limited partnerships.
(R.

2112, 2215-16) and in addition he continually delayed any effort

to seek help from the courts to remove Sampson from his position of
general partner.

(R.

2248-49) .

Since a general partner is obligated by law to pay the debts of
the limited partnerships the argument advanced by Respondents is
unusual to say the least.

Essentially Respondents seek an award of all

the monies collected by Sampson during this period of time even though
the money was used, as found by the court, for the benefit of the
limited partnerships.

Thus, the respondents wish to have the income

returned to them without the requirement of paying the outgoing
expenses.
Respondents have cited no legal authority for this unique
proposition nor is there any.

The facts of this case as well as the

circumstances relating to Respondents' own conduct during this period
of time clearly justifies the lower court's conclusion that Respondents
were not entitled to a credit for the income used by Sampson for the
benefit of the limited partnerships.
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY DECLINED TO AWARD
DAMAGES TO THE RESPONDENTS FOR THE LOAN
ADVANCES THEY HAD MADE TO THE LIMITED
PARTNERSHIPS.
The final contention made on the cross appeal is that the lower
court should have awarded to the respondents some $700,000 which
consists of loan advances and interest supposedly made by the general
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partners to the limited partners.

Respondents claim that the lower

court "inexplicably declined to require Sampson to pay damages" for his
tortious interference.

(Respondents1 Brief, pp.

68-70).

A review of the Findings, however, shows that the lower court on
several occasions explained in detail why the advances should not be
credited to the respondents.
partnership agreements.

First, the court noted the terms of the

Article 5 allowed the general partner in its

discretion to advance monies to the partnerships for use in the
operation of the partnerships.

The agreements provided that such

advances were not to be deemed capital contributions but that they
would be immediately due and payable upon the sale of the property or
the termination and dissolution of the partnership unless otherwise
agreed upon.

(R.

2100) .

Next, the lower court disputed the figures now urged by the
respondents in this appeal.

The court observed that the original

settlement agreement between the parties in June of 1980 reflected an
alleged advance of $393,840 rather than the $585,036 claimed by
Respondents.

(R.

2146).

The court stated that the proper documentation did not occur:
The evidence did not contain anything about loan
instruments having been prepared when such advances
were made or repayments being made out of gross
receipts in accordance with the "terms of the loan
instruments". It being noted here and I so find that
the promissory notes which Richins prepared on or about
June 5, 1980 and signed for the partnership as
president of the general partner, did not constitute
the "loan instruments" as that term was used in the
partnership agreement. (R. 2146-47).
Thus, the lower court found that the required paperwork necessary
for a proper advance to be credited to the respondents had not been
made.
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In addition, the court found that the circumstances triggering the
repayment requirements of any advance had not occurred.

The court

stated:
The evidence does not preponderate in showing that
any of the circumstances mentioned in the partnership
agreements as triggering the repayment requirements was
proven to have occurred. (R. 2149) .
In its Conclusions of Law the court referred to §48-2-23 which
provides that in settling accounts after dissolution of a limited
partnership the liabilities shall be entitled to payment in a fixed
order.

The court observed that obligations to general partners was

fourth on the list after payment to creditors and to limited partners
with respect to their capital contributions.

The court observed:

It is apparent that repayment of the advances to
the general partners was conditional upon the end
results of each partnership, which leave no assurance
that any partnership, if properly wound up, as provided
by law and the partnership agreements, would have been
able to repay any of the obligations owed by it to the
general partner for such advances. (R. 2260).
Thus, contrary to the statements contained in Respondents' Brief
the lower court found that (1) the amount of advances was considerably
less than that now claimed by the respondents; (2) that the respondents
had failed to execute the necessary documents and to follow the
required procedure when advances were allegedly made; (3) that in any
event, none of the conditions which would have allowed a repayment of
advances was shown to have occurred and the probability was that the
partnerships would have no funds sufficient after dissolution to pay
any obligation remaining to the general partners.
Again, it should also be noted that had the respondents desired to
assert their claim of advances it would have been a simple matter back
in 1980 or 1981 to undertake a dissolution of the partnerships and to
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wind up the affairs of each partnership.

At that time, the general

partners could have asserted the validity of any claim and distributed
any assets which were then existing*

Instead, however, the respondents

essentially waited some four or five years to assert their belated
claim of unpaid advances.
The Finding and Conclusion of the lower court was therefore
correct and Respondents are not entitled to any additional judgment for
alleged advances made.
CONCLUSION
Respondents have failed to rebut the arguments made by Sampson in
support of his contention that the lower court erred in awarding
damages against him.

For the reasons previously stated, therefore,

those awards should be vacated.
The Respondents on their cross appeal have likewise failed to
rebut the factual findings and legal conclusions of the lower court
relating to their claim for additional damages.

The lower court was

correct in denying these damages based upon the facts and circumstances
of this case.
Respectfully submitted this 8th day of August, 1988.
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